When is libel criminal

Defamatory imputation is the defamatory accusation or charge that the plaintiff alleges is conveyed by the matter published by the defendant concerning the plaintiff. The imputation may take the form of words, symbols, pictures, cartoon or signs. Without a defamatory imputation, there is no libel. For example, the reference in a magazine article to a deceased Muslim patriarch as not belonging to a royal house and having once lived with an American family, is not defamatory.

Titles of royalty are not generally recognized in our national community with republican and egalitarian foundation. Likewise, it is also not unusual for citizens to live with and share in the culture or mores of foreigners.

No actual malice. Malice indicates the presence of personal ill will or spite, or the intention to injure the reputation of the person defamed.

In a libel case it consists in intentionally publishing, without justifiable cause, any written or printed matter which is injurious to the character of another. Malice may be defined, insofar as defamation is concerned, as acting in bad faith and with knowledge of falsity of statements. The existence of malice is implied or presumed by law from the fact of a defamatory publication malice in law. The particular intent of the offender to cast dishonor, discredit or contempt on the person libeled is termed actual malice, or express malice, or malice in fact.

No publication. Publication refers to the dissemination of the defamatory matter to any person other than the person injuriously affected thereby.

Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. Victim not identified.

The element of identifiability means that the third person who read or learned about the libelous matter must know that it referred to the plaintiff. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication.

Supreme Court in the case of New York Times v. Actual malice cannot be imputed merely because the information turns out to be false.

An erroneous interpretation of facts does not meet the standard of actual malice. Truth of the libelous statement. By way of exceptions, proof of truth will help exonerate the author of the defamation in the following:. In a criminal prosecution for libel, if the accused presents, in addition to proof of the truth of the matter charged as libelous, good motives and justifiable ends in publishing the matter, he shall be acquitted.

When the offended party is a Government employee, if the defamatory imputation is related to the discharge of his official duties, even if the imputation does not constitute a crime, proof of truth is sufficient for acquittal. Privileged communication.

In libel law, the term privileged communication refers to statements which, though having the elements of libel, are nevertheless accorded protection from liability due to considerations or interests that outweigh the need for redress to the private injury sustained by the offended party as a result of the defamatory statements. The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though as an incidental result it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.

Privileged communication is of two kinds: a absolute, and b conditional or qualified. Absolutely privileged communication. A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith.

It is a total immunity granted on the basis of the position or status of the author or speaker. The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.

Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they can be supported by evidence in good faith, the contents of which would be under scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein.

This absolute privilege protects only the persons who uttered or wrote the statements in the course of the proceedings. Those who published or caused the publication of such statements may claim the conditional or qualified privilege of a fair and true report of official proceedings under the second exception of Art.

Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication. The privilege consists in the removal of the legal presumption of malice arising from the defamatory imputation contained in the two types of communication mentioned in Art. Requirement for publicity. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

The fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable; the privileged character simply does away with the presumption of malice, which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case. Private communication.

A complaint made in good faith and without malice, made under an honest sense of duty, in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or board having some interest or duty in the matter, is covered by the privilege even if the statements are found to be false, provided that the person has probable cause for belief in the truthfulness of the charge.

The duty may pertain to a social or moral duty and the party believes in good faith that he is acting pursuant to such duty. The requisites of a privileged private communication under the first paragraph of Art. The communication is made in good faith.

To be considered privileged, the subject communication must be free from any taint of malice. The writer has an interest or duty in reference to the subject. It is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them.

The judge filed a criminal action for libel against the complainant. The recipient of the communication has jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or the power to redress the grievance, or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith.

The communication is done in private. The privilege is lost if the writer publishes and circulates the communication among the public. Fair and true report of official proceedings. The second paragraph of Art.

A fair and true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated is covered by the privilege. In one case, a newspaper columnist was sued for libel for publishing an article that quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by certain persons charging the brokerage company, particularly its board chairman and controlling stockholder, and its president-general manager, of engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market.

The Supreme Court held that the published article was a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. What petitioner has done was simply to furnish the readers with the information that a complaint has been filed against the brokerage firm.

Then he proceeded to reproduce that pleading verbatim in his column. He is obligated to keep the public abreast of the current news in that particular field. On this crucial point, the Court is inclined to resolve all doubts in favor of petitioner and declare that there is no libel. Therefore, they should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice and falsehood. First, the "statement" can be spoken, written, pictured, or even gestured. Because written statements last longer than spoken statements, most courts, juries, and insurance companies consider libel more harmful than slander.

Of course, it could also have been written in magazines, books, newspapers, leaflets, or on picket signs. A defamatory statement must be false -- otherwise it's not considered damaging.

Even terribly mean or disparaging things are not defamatory if the shoe fits. Most opinions don't count as defamation because they can't be proved to be objectively false. For instance, when a reviewer says, "That was the worst book I've read all year," she's not defaming the author, because the statement can't be proven to be false.

The statement must be "injurious. Someone who already had a terrible reputation most likely won't collect much in a defamation suit. Finally, to qualify as a defamatory statement, the offending statement must be " unprivileged. For example, witnesses who testify falsely in court or at a deposition can't be sued. Although witnesses who testify to something they know is false could theoretically be prosecuted for perjury.

Lawmakers have decided that in these and other situations, which are considered "privileged," free speech is so important that the speakers should not be constrained by worries that they will be sued for defamation. Lawmakers themselves also enjoy this privilege: They aren't liable for statements made in the legislative chamber or in official materials, even if they say or write things that would otherwise be defamatory.

The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice. People who aren't elected but who are still public figures because they are influential or famous -- like movie stars -- also have to prove that defamatory statements were made with actual malice, in most cases.

In the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan , the U. After the bitter election of ended with Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson assuming office as president, the Sedition Act was allowed to expire in Jefferson pardoned all those convicted under the act, and Congress refunded the fines imposed on them.

Meanwhile, state libel prosecutions continued. In the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Constitution did not alter the English common law of criminal libel, and in the same court rejected the argument that the right to criticize public officials should be protected.

In People v. Croswell N. A majority of states gradually adopted this limited-truth defense. Some states developed their own varieties of criminal libel, such as applying it to statements about groups of people , those made only to the complainant, and those about the dead. In the s, the Supreme Court justified criminal libel in a handful of cases that indirectly raised the issue.

In Near v. Minnesota , the Court held that an injunction barring the publication of a newspaper that criticized local elected officials was unconstitutional and amounted to censorship. In Cantwell v. Despite the split regarding the result, all of the justices accepted that criminal libel law rested on secure constitutional foundations. Sullivan Although Sullivan involved civil libel, the decision also influenced criminal libel. Later the same year the Court ruled, in Garrison v. Louisiana , that truth must be an absolute defense to criminal libel.

This ruling effectively eliminated common law criminal libel. These rulings, and the influence of the restatement, led several jurisdictions to repeal their criminal libel provisions. In other jurisdictions, courts struck down these provisions, either totally or as they applied to statements regarding public officials and matters of public concern. Courts in some states, however, upheld criminal libel statutes, often by reading an actual malice requirement into the law.

In Phelps v. The state later amended its statute explicitly to require actual malice.